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COLLUSION TO FIX WAGES AND OTHER
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT:
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN LABOR AND
ANTITRUST LAW
LARRY SMITH
AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW generally prohibits ac-
tivity which restrains freedom of trade.1  At the same
time, American labor law encourages activity which does in
fact restrain trade.2 The inherent conflict between these two
substantive bodies of law is obvious. Congress and the courts
have attempted to form a workable body of law which recon-
ciles these conflicting doctrines. As a result, labor unions
have traditionally been given a broad, but not unlimited, ex-
emption to the federal antitrust laws.3 In recent years, how-
ever, courts have narrowed this exemption considerably.'
Activities by unions which in prior years would have been
held exempt from antitrust laws without reflection may no
longer be protected by this exemption.' Because of this ero-
ISee Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 1-7 (1970).
2 See St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REV.
601, 604 (1976).
See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (holding that Sherman
Act was not intended to cover kind of trade restraint resulting from union activities);
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) (holding that any union activities,
legal or illegal, engaged in for the sole benefit of the union are exempt from antitrust
laws); Clayton Antitrust Act § § 6, 20, 15 U.S.C. § § 12-27 (1976) (removing labor
from ambit of Sherman Act); Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976)
(removed jurisdiction of Federal Courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes).
4 Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
Handler and Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws. The Emasculation of
the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 485 (1981). [hereinafter cited as Handler].
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sion of labor's exemption from antitrust laws, it is no longer
certain to what extent labor's activities will be subject to anti-
trust liability.
The uncertainty extends to agreements among unions
fixing the level of wages to be demanded from their respective
employers. Courts have addressed the issue of antitrust liabil-
ity for employer-union combinations to fix the level of wages
to be demanded6 and employer agreements to fix the wages
paid to their respective employees.7 Courts have not had the
opportunity to consider whether a union's agreement with
another union to fix the level of wages to be demanded from
their respective employers would result in antitrust liability
for the unions involved.
This paper will address the question of whether unions
combining to fix their demands for wages and other terms of
employment are entitled to the protection of labor's exemp-
tion from antitrust laws. This paper will first briefly outline
labor's historical exemption from antitrust law. Second, em-
ployer combinations aimed at employees will be reviewed as
offering possible insights as to how courts might treat similar
behavior by unions. Finally, the question of unions' liability
for combining to fix wages and other terms of employment
will be addressed.
I. LABOR'S HISTORICAL EXEMPTION FROM
ANTITRUST LAWS
Labor's exemption from antitrust laws is not a recent phe-
nomenon. Even before the passage of the Sherman Act,
courts had suggested that common law restraint of trade laws
should not apply to the collective activities of employees.8
America's first comprehensive antitrust law, the Sherman
See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
See Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842) (Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that criminal liability could not be imposed on unions for their
collective activities unless the unions' objectives and means of achieving these objec-
tives were illegal). See also R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 621 (1976).
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Act,9 was enacted in 1890. The legislative history of the Sher-
man Act suggests that Congress did not intend for the Sher-
man Act to apply to labor unions.'° The courts did not heed
the legislative history and applied the Sherman Act to labor
activities." Congress decided that labor should be given an
express exemption to the Sherman Act and passed the Clay-
ton Act 2 in 1914.' 3 The Clayton Act removed labor unions
and their activities from the scope of the Sherman Act by
declaring that an individual's labor was not to be considered
commerce. 4 When the courts failed to give the Clayton Act
I Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1970)).
'° Casey & Cozzillio, Labor - Antitrust." The Problems of Connell and a Remedy that Follows
Naturally, 1980 DUKE L.J. 235, 237. [hereinafter cited as Casey]; St. Antoine, supra note
2, at 603.
The Congressional debates on the subject of whether the Sherman Act applied to
labor indicate that only one senator thought the Act applied to labor, while eight sena-
tors indicated on the floor of the Senate that the Act did not apply to labor. E.
BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT 39-40 (1930). There were other indicators
that Congress did not intend for the Sherman Act to apply to labor unions and their
collective activities. See id., at 51-52 for a short discussion of these other indications of
Congress' intent.
" The most famous of these cases is Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), which is
also known as the Danbury Hatters case. In this case, the Supreme Court held that an
action under the Sherman Act could be maintained against a union which organized a
nationwide boycott against the hat manufacturer. Id. at 292-93. See also United States
v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1976); Ako-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 35
F.2d 203 (E.D. Pa. 1929); Casey, supra note 10, at 238.
In commenting on the courts' willingness to apply the Sherman Act to labor's activi-
ties, one author observed: "It thus appears that the courts, in deciding that Congress
intended that the Antitrust Law should reach labor unions, came to a conclusion
which cannot be supported by a careful and thoroughgoing examination of the most
substantial evidence available, the Congressional Record." E. BERMAN, supra note 10,
at 53.
'2 Clayton Antitrust Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 371 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (1976)).
, R. GORMAN, supra note 8, at 622. See Antfirust Law Developments, 1975 A.B.A. SEC.
ANTITRUST L. 398 [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Law Developments].
14 Clayton Antitrust Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 17 (1976)). The pertinent part of Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of com-
merce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to
forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations . . . or to
forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from law-
fully carrying out the legitmate objectives thereof, be held or construed
to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws.
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the scope Congress intended, 15 Congress enacted another law
to clarify its intention to give labor an exemption from anti-
trust laws. 6 The Norris-LaGuardia Act removed from the
federal courts the jurisdiction to issue injunctions in cases in-
volving labor disputes. 17 These two statutes taken together
were meant to exempt labor's activities during labor disputes
from the antitrust statutes. 8
The Supreme Court established the scope of the exemption
from antitrust law afforded to labor by the Clayton and Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Acts in three key cases in the middle of the
century. In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,'9 the Supreme Court
carved out a non-statutory exemption from the antitrust laws
for labor by reinterpreting the Sherman act as not intended
to cover the type of trade restraint resulting from union activ-
ity.20 In effect, under the non-statutory exemption, a labor
union would be exempt unless the intention or effect of the
union's activity is to restrain competition in the market for
the employer's goods.2 '
Id.
'5 See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), and Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters Assoc., 274 U.S. 37 (1927). In these cases, the
Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the provisions of the Clayton Act, holding that
the Act only applied to labor disputes involving direct employer/employee relation-
ships. These cases involved picketing and other activities by individuals who were not
employed at the plant that they were picketing. See also R. GORMAN, supra note 8, at
622-23; Antitrust Law Development, supra note 13, at 399.
11 Norris-LaGuardia (Anti-injunction) Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current ver-
sion at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-105 (1976)).
" Id Specifically, section 4 of the Act removed the Federal Courts' jurisdiction to
issue injunctions in labor disputes. It provides: "No court of the United States shall
have the jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunc-
tion in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute . 29 U.S.C. § 104
(1976).
The purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is to "restore the broad purpose which
Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton Act but which was frustrated, so
Congress believed, by unduly restrictive judicial construction." United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
,a United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232, 235-36 (1941).
,q 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
Id. at 491-94, 501-03. The Court observed: "[A]n elimination of price competi-
tion based on differences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor or-
ganization. But this effect on competition has not been considered to be the kind of
curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act. Id at 503-04.
2, Id at 512. See Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 13, at 402.
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The second case of this era interpreting the scope of labor's
exemption from antitrust laws under the Clayton and Norris-
LaGuardia Acts was United States v. Hutcheson.22 The
Supreme Court did not utilize the Apex Hosiey non-statutory
formula to analyze the case. The Court instead reasoned that
because the jurisdiction of the federal courts to enjoin such an
action had been removed by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it
followed that the unions were also exempt from the substan-
tive provisions of the act.23 The Supreme Court converted
the procedural-jurisdictional language of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act into a substantive exemption for labor from all anti-
trust laws. 24 The effect of Hutcheson was to create a statutory
exemption from the antitrust laws for any and all union ac-
tivity as long as the union was acting in its own interests and
not in combination with non-labor groups.25
The Supreme Court applied the principles of Apex Hlosier
and Hutcheson in the third important case of this era interpret-
ing labor's exemption from antitrust laws. In Allen Bradley
Co. v. Local Union 3, IBEW, 26 the Supreme Court ruled that a
union forfeited its exemption from antitrust laws when it
combined with non-labor groups to achieve a restraint of
trade.27 The central idea of this case was that a union would
only be exempt from antitrust laws if it was acting by itself.28
The union's activity in Allen Bradley was not protected by the
Apex Hlosiery non-statutory exemption because the restraint
2 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
:, Id. at 234-35.
2' Handler, supra note 5, at 475.
2. 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941). The Court stated:
So long as a union acts in self-interest and does not combine with non-
labor groups, the licit and illicit under § 20 are not to be distinguished
by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or
wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the partic-
ular union is the means.
Id
. 325 U.S. 797 (1945). In Allen Bradley, the union and the electrical contractors and
manufacturers had entered into an elaborate agreement which had the effect of ex-
cluding all manufacturers of electrical equipment who were not located in New York
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went beyond the labor market, and the Hutcheson statutory
exemption did not apply because the union was not acting by
itself.29
This trilogy of cases: Apex Hosiery, Hutcheson, and Allen
Bradley, formed the basis of labor's exemption from antitrust
laws which remained intact for approximately twenty years.3
Under these cases, if a labor union's activities and conduct
are within the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, they are
exempt under the statutory exemption of Hutcheson? If the
union's activities only affect the market for labor and not the
market for final goods, an antitrust exemption is provided
under the non-statutory exemption laid out in Apex Hosiery .32
Finally, under the A/len Bradley decision, as long as the union
is acting alone and solely for its self-interest, the activity is
exempt. 3
During the two decades following Allen Bradley, the focus in
labor law switched from union's activities at the plants to the
collective bargaining process between management and la-
bor.3 ' This shift in emphasis forced the Supreme Court to
reconsider its earlier decisions concerning the scope of labor's
exemption from antitrust laws.35 Specifically, the Court had
to determine both the scope of labor's antitrust exemption in
the collective bargaining arena and whether bargaining over
a mandatory subject 36 could result in antitrust liability. 37
The first case in which the Supreme Court re-examined la-
bor's exemption from antitrust laws was United Mine Workers v.
Pennington38 In Pennigton, the Supreme Court extended the
- St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 608.
- Id; Casey, supra note 10, at 242.
1, Handler, supra note 5, at 483.
1 Id at 481, 483.
SId.
Casey, supra note 10, at 242.
~'Id
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1956) labeled
wages, hours and other terms of employment as subjects of mandatory bargaining.
Representatives of the employers and employees by law must bargain over these sub-
jects in good faith. Id at 348-49. Congress codified the Court's mandate in Borg-
Warner in the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
" Casey, supra note 10, at 242.
381 U.S. 657 (1965). In Pennington, the UMW and several large coal companies
Allen Bradley rule 39 by imposing liability for collusion in the
actual bargaining process."0 The Court also suggested that a
balancing process should be used to determine if the exemp-
tion should be forfeited., On the whole, Pennington indicated
that an agreement on mandatory bargaining subjects reached
during the collective bargaining process does not provide un-
ions with an unconditional exemption from antitrust
liability. 2
The companion case to Penningon was Meat Cutters Local
189 v. Jewel Tea Co. "3 In Jewel Tea, the Court ruled that a
union did not lose its exemption from antitrust laws where,
even though the union's activitiy did in fact restrain trade,
the union was acting alone in matters intimately related to
wages and other terms of employment. 4 The Court indi-
cated that the exemption would be forfeited if an agreed
upon restraint was not genuinely related to legitimate union
interests.4 5 The Court again, as in Penning/on, balanced the
benefits received by the union from the agreement against
the impact that the agreement would have on market compe-
tition to determine if labor had forfeited its exemption. 6
The Supreme Court further examined labor's exemption
from antitrust liability in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers &
entered into an agreement whereby the UMW agreed to demand a high wage from all
mine operators, including those small operators who could not afford to pay high
wages. Id. at 659-60. The purpose of the agreement was to drive the smaller coal
operators out of business. Id at 660.
3 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
- In determining liability, the Court in Allen Bradley focused on the external impacts
of the agreement and not on the bargaining process. Allen Bradely, 325 U.S. at 799-800,
809.
4, 381 U.S. at 665-69.
.2 Id. at 665-65.
- 381 U.S. 676 (1965). In Jewel Tea, the union had refused to relax the marketing
restrictions in their present contract which forced supermarket meat counters to close
after 6:00 p.m. Id at 680. Other stores agreed but, Jewel Tea initially refused to accept
this demand. Id at 680. Jewel Tea later signed an agreement with the union which
included the meat counter clause. Id at 681.
- Id. at 689-90.
45 Id The Court indicated that antitrust immunity could not be claimed if the
union forced a schedule of meat prices upon Jewel Tea. Id at 689.
- Id at 690 n.5, 691. R. GORMAN,supra note 8, at 633. Casey, supra note 10, at 244-
45.
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Sleamfiters Local 100.41 The Court in Connell basically held
that a union may forfeit its antitrust exemption even where it
is acting on its own and seeking a lawful and legitimate ob-
jective.48 The Court established that labor's exemption was
limited to those agreements which restricted competition in
the product market through the elimination of competition
for wages and other terms of employment.49
The Supreme Court's decisions in Penningon, Jewel Tea, and
Connell indicate that the scope of labor's exemption from an-
titrust law has been narrowed. Labor no longer enjoys the
almost absolute immunity from antitrust laws which Apex Ho-
s ery and Hutcheson bestowed upon it. In light of the Court's
recent trend, even union activities connected to mandatory
bargaining subjects can result in antitrust liability. The
scope of labor's exemption from antitrust liability is now to
be determined by balancing the labor policy furthered by the.
union activity against the harm this activity does to antitrust
policy.
II. EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR COLLUSION TO FIX
WAGES AND OTHER CONDITIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT
As stated previously, employers acting on their own, not in
combination with a union, have been subject to the strictures
of the federal antitrust laws in their dealings with employ-
ees.50 A review of the behavior by employers acting in con-
cert which has been found to violate the Sherman Act may be
4' 421 U.S. 616 (1975). The union in Connell was seeking to have Connell, a general
contractor, sign an agreement with the union whereby Connell would only sub-con-
tract with firms which had a collective bargaining agreement with the union. Id at
618-19. The union was not seeking to organize Connell's employees, but the employees
of the plumbing sub-contractors used by Connell. Id
48 Id at 623.
49 Id at 622-23. In Connell, the agreement went beyond a simple restriction of com-
petition in the product market through the elimination of competition for wages and
other conditions of employment because it also "indiscriminately excluded nonunion
subcontractors from a portion of the market, even if their competitive advantages were
not derived from substandard wages and working conditions but rather from efficient
operating methods." Id at 623.
- See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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helpful in determining what form of combinations by unions
may be held non-exempt from antitrust laws. While these
rulings on management behavior do not in any way guaran-
tee that the same rules will be applied to labor, they can illu-
minate the restrictive effects on the market that courts are
trying to prevent in the labor/management area and thus
give a hint as to how the courts would treat similar union
behavior.
As far back as 1926, courts have held that employer combi-
nations aimed at fixing the wages of their employees violate
the Sherman Act.51 There are several kinds of such behavior
which have been found illegal. The two basic requirements
for finding liability are that the activity actually was a re-
straint of trade and that it was made outside a collective bar-
gaining agreement arrived at in arms-length negotiations. 52
The most obvious and blatantly illegal combinations occur
when unassociated employers conspire directly to fix the
wages of their employees. A prime example of this conduct
occurred in Cordova v. Bache & Co. 51 In Cordova, it was alleged
that the employers, forty-two stock exchange brokerages and
the New York Stock Exchange, had conspired to reduce the
commissions on sales of securities paid to securities represent-
atives.54 The court determined that a cause of action under
the antitrust laws did exist for such employer activity.55
The Cordova court based its decision on two grounds. First,
the court noted that the fact that the employers had the
power to reduce commissions paid to the securities represent-
atives indicated that "they ha[d] the same power to restrain
competition as is inherent in a price fixing agreement."56
Second, the court found this kind of arrangement illegal be-
Anderson v. Shipowners Assoc., 272 U.S. 359 (1926).
Comment, Antitrust Law in the Labor Management Context; The Employer as Defendant
and the Union as Platiff, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 385, 389 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, Antitrust]; Goldberg, Antitrust: The Union as Plaintff, 1980 INST. ON LAB. LAW 174,
182.
Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Id. at 603.
Id at 608.
6 Id at 606.
1983]
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cause it restrained the ability of a worker to change jobs and
to seek higher pay.57
Employers are also subject to federal antitrust laws when
they combine to limit their employees' or future employees'
ability to bargain for the sale of their services. The best ex-
amples of this illegal arrangement can be seen in the numer-
ous cases concerning the relationship between professional
athletes and the owners of professional sports clubs.5" These
cases generally deal with a challenge to the validity of the
various draft and contract provisions of professional sports
because of the impact they have on the competition for ath-
letes' services.
In Mackey v. National Football League," a player challenged a
rule known as the "Rozelle Rule" which limited the ability of
a player to contract freely with the sports franchise of his
choice.' The district court found that the rule weakened a
player's bargaining power, and as a result players were de-
nied the opportunity to sell their services in a free and open
market.6" Because of this effect, the rule was found to violate
section 1 of the Sherman Act.
In Robertson v. National Basketball Associatt'on,62 the court
analogized the player draft, the reserve clause and the stan-
dard player contract of the NBA to price-fixing devices con-
sidered per se violations of the Sherman Act.63 The court
reasoned that these devices allowed competing teams to elim-
.57 Id
-* See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Kapp v.
National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); Boston Professional Hockey Assoc. v.
Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management,
Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
- 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
- Id at 609. The "Rozelle Rule" requires that if a player's contract with a team
ends, and that player choses to play for a second team, the second team is to give the
first team some compensation for the player. Id at 609 n.l. The Rule inhibits teams
from signing players because the teams do not want to have to pay the compensation.
Id at 618.
6, Id at 620.
62 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
63 Id at 893.
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inate competition in the hiring of players.64 Similarly in Smith
v. Pro-Football,65 a court found the NFL draft to be a restraint
of trade because by allowing a player to deal with only one
team, that individual was robbed of all bargaining power.66
Because players were not permitted to market their talents
the effect of the draft was to "suppress or even destroy compe-
tition in the market for players' services."67
Such illegal restrictions on employees' freedom to market
their skills are also found outside the professional sports
arena. In Cordova v. Bache,68 the court based its decision on
the fact that employees would not be able to sell their services
freely in an open, competitive market.69 In an early Supreme
Court case, the Court found a group of employers guilty of
antitrust violations not only because their agreement had
limited the ability of employees to market their skills, but also
because the employers had limited their own ability to com-
pete for such services.7 ° These decisions indicate that an ar-
rangement which restricts an individual's right to sell his
talents or which limits an employer's ability to bid for the
services of an individual can result in liability under the fed-
eral antitrust laws.
III. UNION LIABILITY UNDER ANTITRUST LAWS
It is clear that employers will be held liable under antitrust
laws for colluding to fix the wages of their employees.71 It is
also clear that unions will be held liable under the antitrust
laws if they combine with an employer to fix the wages that
the union will demand from other employers.72 The specific
question of a union's liability under the antitrust laws for col-
luding with another union to fix their demands for wages or
SId.
593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978), afg, 420 F. Supp 738 (D.D.C. 1976).
, Id. at 1185.
17 Id. at 1185-86.
- 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See supra note 53.
- 321 F. Supp. at 606.
71 Anderson v. Shipowners Assoc., 272 U.S. 359 (1926). See Comment, Antitrust,
supra note 52, at 389.
" Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
72 Pennington, 381 U.S. at 661.
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other conditions of employment, however, has not been ad-
dressed by the courts.
The question of whether a union loses its exemption from
antitrust liability for colluding with another union to fix the
wages to be demanded from their respective employers could
arise in several ways. The situation most likely to occur is a
combination between two or more unions, each representing
a similiar bargaining unit at different plants. In this situa-
tion, for example, Union A and Union B would hypotheti-
cally represent plumbers performing similar duties but at
different plants owned by different people. Unions A and B
would agree to demand the same wages or conditions of em-
ployment from their respective employers. They would also
agree to coordinate their negotiating activities.
A second scenario in which the question of whether a
union forfeits its antitrust exemption for colluding with an-
other union is presented where two or more unions at the
same plant, but in different bargaining units, agree to de-
mand the same wages or conditions of employment from
their employer. In this scenario, for example, Union A would
hypothetically represent the plumbers and Union B the ma-
chinists. Once again, the unions would agree to fix their de-
mands for wages and to coordinate their bargaining
activities.7 3
Before reaching the question of whether the combination
of Unions A and B would cause them to forfeit their exemp-
tion from antitrust laws, it must first be determined if the
activities in the examples above would be considered a re-
straint of trade outside the labor field. This type of conduct
has been found to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act when
engaged in by combinations of non-labor groups. First, such
conduct could be analogized to a simple price-fixing agree-
ment. In essence, Union A and Union B are merely combin-
ing to fix the price of a commodity used in production.
Courts have condemned agreements by suppliers which fix
'1 This second scenario might also be presented if Union A and B are locals of the
same international union, as long as they are not negotiating a single contract for both
units.
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the price at which they are going to sell the commodity.74
Even absent a specific agreement to set prices, companies
have been found to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act by
coordinating their price changes so that their pricing behav-
ior is parallel. 75 The coordination of negotiations by Union A
and B arguably falls into this category of illegal conduct.
Even if the unions merely published or made known to each
other what their demands in negotiations would be, if the ef-
fect of this conduct would be to standardize wage demands,
the conduct would be considered illegal.76 Against this back-
ground, it appears that such collusive conduct by the unions
is illegal unless it is afforded some exemption from federal
antitrust laws.
A. Arguments for Exempting Collusive Union Activity
A union involved in the conduct posed by the two scena-
rios discussed above has several arguments available to de-
fend its exemption from antitrust laws. First, the activity
involved only impacts on the labor market and thus falls
under the "labor marketper se" exemption.77 Second, labor's
statutory exemption from antitrust laws applies to this activ-
ity. Finally, labor's non-statutory exemption from antitrust
laws would apply to insulate the unions from antitrust
liability.
Against allegations of violations of the antitrust laws, a
union involved in the conduct posed by the examples dis-
cussed above could be expected to raise as a defense that an-
titrust laws do not apply because the only subject involved is
the labor market. This assertion is supported by such com-
mentators as Professor Cox, who stated, "No one seriously
suggests that antitrust policy should be concerned with the
7. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927)(holding that
price fixing by an association of manufacturers of vitreous pottery controlling 82% of
the relevant market violated section 1 of the Sherman Act).
Ir United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (conscious parallel
price changes are evidence of an illegal conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman
Act).
7 Id
7See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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labor market per se." 78 The policy behind this statement, as
embodied in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),7 9 is
to protect collective activity by employees when they are
seeking to negotiate with their employers over wages and
other conditions of employment.80 This is true even if the
collective activity could be considered anti-competitive. The
position is not novel and has been followed by courts."' One
judge has even interpreted the Supreme Court's Connell deci-
sion to be in line with the "labor market per se" theory.2
Alternatively, the union could claim that the activity was
insulated from antitrust liability by one part of the tradi-
tional labor exemption. The statutory exemption embodied
in the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, as interpreted in
Hutcheson83 and its progeny, exempt the combination from
the antitrust laws. 4 In Hutcheson, the Supreme Court stated
that as long as labor was not acting with non-labor groups,
any legal or illegal activity engaged is exempt from antitrust
laws. 5
In the posed scenarios, the union is combining with an-
T. Cox, Labor and the Antirust Laws-Ar/iminag Anaysis, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 252, 254
(1955). Professor Cox added, "[W]here a union controls job opportunities, it may
abuse its power by limiting access to the trade, arbitrary discrimination, denials of
individual liberty or unwarranted discipline; but these are problems primarily affect-
ing labor-management relations or internal union affairs. They have little to do with
the purpose of antitrust laws." Id at 254-55.
7" National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § § 141, 151-187 (1976)).
-o Section 7 of the NLRA reads in part: "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... "
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1976)).
a, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F.
Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
82 Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F.
Supp. 482, 487, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
8" The Court in Hutcheson interpreted the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts as
supplying for labor an exemption from the antitrust laws for any of their activities,
including criminal activities, directed at a legitimate end. See supra notes 22-25 and
accompanying text.
312 U.S. 219 (1941).
Id at 232.
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other labor group; they are not combining with a non-labor
group. Since one policy behind the Norris-LaGuardia and
Clayton Acts was to give labor more flexibility in achieving
its legitimate goals,8 6 a combination of two or more labor
groups does not offend the aims of the acts. To hold this ac-
tivity non-exempt would handicap labor in its efforts to
achieve legitimate goals which are protected by the NLRA.
The union could also claim that the agreement between
the unions was exempt under the non-statutory exemption
first espoused in Apex Hosie0 , .87 In Apex Hosziy,88 the Court
held that since the Sherman Act was aimed at direct price
restraints in the product market and not on the labor mar-
ket's indirect effect on price competition in the product mar-
ket, trade-restraining activity by a labor union was not
subject to antitrust liability.89 The idea that agreements
which only reduce or eliminate price competition because of
equalization of labor standards are exempt from the antitrust
laws was reaffirmed in the Connell decision.'
In the two basic scenarios, the union's wage demands are
the subject of the agreement. This alone is not proof of an
attempt or intention to control product prices directly; there-
fore, the agreement appears to fall under the non-statutory
exemption. The impact on and restraint of the commercial
market, which is scrutinized under both Apex Hosiery and Con-
nell, results from the standardization of labor conditions. Be-
cause the restraint on the product market only occurs as a
result of the standardization of labor standards, Unions A
and B would not forfeit their nonstatutory exemption.
In addition, the exemption set out in Jewel Tea also appears
applicable. In Jewel Tea,9 the Court interpreted the non-
statutory exemption to encompass any matters bargained
over which were of genuine interest or intimately related to
labor concerns, even if they did cause some restraint of com-
- Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 13, at 400.
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
SId
Id. at 491-94, 501-03.
421 U.S. at 622.
Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
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petition in the product market.92 The unions' demands in the
hypothetical situation are clearly intimately related to legiti-
mate union concerns; wages and other conditions of employ-
ment.93 While the Court in Jewel Tea indicated that the
interests of labor in the subject being bargained over would
be weighed against the impact it would cause in the product
market,94 it would be difficult to imagine labor's interest be-
ing outweighed since wages are of a much more direct inter-
est to labor than are marketing hour restrictions and since the
restraint on the product market would be slight.95
B. Argumentfor Not Exempting Collusive Union Activity
The combination of Union A and B to fix their wage de-
mands might arguably cause them to forfeit their exemption
to antitrust laws. It can be argued that the statutory exemp-
tion does not apply to these scenarios because of the actual
language of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts and be-
cause courts have narrowed the scope of the statutory exemp-
tion.96 The non-statutory exemption also probably does not
afford the unions protection because of the balancing process
involved.97 Finally, the policy behind the antitrust laws, as
interpreted by the courts, suggests that this type of collusive
activity does not escape liability under the antitrust laws.98
The hypothetical combination of Union A and Union B to
set their wage demands arguably falls outside the protection
afforded labor by the statutory exemption. As stated previ-
9 Id at 689-91.
"' See id. Since the Supreme Court in Borg- Warner directed that employers and em-
ployees must bargain about wages, hours and other conditons of employment, it can be
inferred that demands concerning wages, hours, and conditions of employment would
be considered genuinely related to the union's interest.
Id at 691.
9, Justice White pointed out that a marketing restriction would have more of an
effect on the final product market than would a simple wage agreement. Id at 691-92.
Despite this greater effect, the interest in the marketing restiction was still held to out-
weigh the anti-competitive effect on the market. Since wage agreements have less of
an effect on the market, the labor policy again outweighs the anti-competitive effects.
Id.
See infra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
See iwfta notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
" See infqa notes 112-121 and accompanying text.
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ously, the goal of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts
was to protect certain labor activities aimed at legitimate
union goals from antitrust liability.99 As interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Hutcheson, this protection was only af-
forded to a union acting unilaterally in its own self interest. 00
The first of these criteria, unilateral action, is not met in
the hypothetical situations. To begin with, unilateral means
"done or undertaken by one person or party."' 0 ' Unions A
and B are not acting alone; they are acting in combination
with one another. The fact that both organizations in the
conspiracy are labor unions does not transform them into a
single entity capable of acting unilaterally.
The Court in Hutcheson also indicatd that a labor group
forfeits its exemption to the antitrust laws if it combines with
a non-labor group. 10 2 The Court's language can be inter-
preted to apply to any combination with a group or organiza-
tion that is not part of that individual labor organization.
Under this interpretation, the combination of Unions A and
B would cause them to lose their exemption from antitrust
laws.
The statutory exemption does not apply to the combina-
tion of Unions A and B because later cases have restricted the
scope of the statutory exemption as defined in Hutcheson. The
Supreme Court in both Pennington and Jewel Tea suggested
that the statutory exemption only applied to those activities
detailed in section 20 of the Clayton Act and section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act."0 3 In Penningion, the Court stated that
since neither of the acts dealt with employer-union agree-
ments, an exemption from antitrust liability could not be
based upon these acts. 10 4
Similarly in Jewel Tea, the Court noted that the determina-
tion of the legality of employer-labor agreements was to be
Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 13, at 400.
,0 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
o, WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 1279 (1979).
102 Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232.
03 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1965); Local 189, Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965).
- Pennington, 381 U.S. at 661-62.
19831
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weighed under the non-statutory exemption, not the statu-
tory exemption."0 5 Thus, the statutory exemption is limited
to the unilateral types of conduct detailed in the Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts. 10 6 Unions A and B cannot enjoy the
protection of the statutory exemption because a single union
is not acting alone and because Unions A and B are not con-
ducting activities protected under either section 20 of the
Clayton Act or section 4 or the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The non-statutory exemption also may not be available to
Unions A and B in this situation. Since the statutory exemp-
tion arguably does not apply, the non-statutory exemption is
the proper vehicle to determine if their activities are exempt.
As noted in Connell,' °7 Pennington andJewel Tea refined the
non-statutory exemption into a weighing process where na-
tional labor and antitrust policy are balanced against each
other."°8 In the instant situation, a court would balance the
union's interest in securing a certain wage for its members
against the anticompetitive behavior of the union. In Jewel
Tea, the Supreme Court found that the union's bargaining
for a marketing-hours restriction was directly related to the
genuine concerns of the union and that the resulting restraint
on trade in the product market was outweighed by labor's
interest. 09
In the hypothetical situations, however, the antitrust policy
tends to outweigh the labor policy. First, to allow the con-
duct of Union A and Union B to be exempt from the anti-
trust laws would be to afford a shield to egregious anti-
competitive practices with an exemption meant for legitimate
union activity. The fact that the union could achieve its goal
in other ways less destructive of competition indicates that
the harm to antitrust policy is much larger than any resulting
harm to labor policy" °
'Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689.
- Connell, 421 U.S. at 621-22; Pennington, 381 U.S. at 662.
0- 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
-o Id. at 622.
'-Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 691.
110 The union could clearly legally bargain solely for its own members wages and
terms of employment without violating antitrust laws. Thus its goal of maximizing its
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Nor do the posed scenarios fall within the facts of Jewel
Tea. The arrangement in Jewel Tea was legal because the
restraint of trade, the marketing hours restriction, was not a
subject remote to the legitimate interests of the union.'11 In
this case, however, the union's interest is remote. Union A's
interest in the level of wages at another plant does not have a
direct enough relationship to the wages paid its members to
sanction the restraint of trade which results from the
agreement.
There are other reasons why the unions in the hypothetical
situations should be found liable under the antitrust laws.
The Court in Pennington indicated that the UMW had also
lost its exemption from antitrust laws because it had by its
agreement restricted its ability to act for the good of its mem-
bers. 112 The Court found this to be contrary to both labor
and antitrust laws and thus not deserving of an exemption." 3
The cases discussed above dealing with professional sports
support the proposition that such activity is violative of anti-
trust laws." 4 These cases also indicate that if collusive activ-
ity restrains another person from functioning in a competitive
market, it is not exempt." 5 The combination of Unions A
members interests would be reached without any competitive restrictions which result
when it colludes with other unions.
." Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 691.
"1 Pennington, 381 U.S. at 665-66. See R. GORMAN, supra note 89, at 630. Gorman
stated:
What ousts the exemption in the case of the UMW, however, is that it
bound itself to an agreement with the large operators to make certain
wage demands upon employers in a different bargaining unit. Thus to
confine one's bargaining flexibility is contrary to the policies of both la-
bor law and antitrust law. Id
" Pennington, 381 U.S. at 666-68.
,,4 See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
1 See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).cert. denied,
434 U.S. 801 (1977) (holding that the National Football Leagues rule allowing the
league commissioner to require a club acquiring a free agent to compensate free agent's
former club was not exempt from coverage of antitrust laws); Smith y. Pro-Football,
420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), affd in part and rev'd in part 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (holding that the professional football league player draft in which plaintiff had
been selected did not violate the Sherman and Clayton Acts); Cordova v. Bache & Co.,
321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding that the provision of the Clayton Act ex-
empting labor groups from antitrust laws did not exempt multi-employer units with
respect to concerted action in reducing compensation of employees).
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and B in the hypothetical situations clearly have two effects:
restraint of their own ability to act and restraint of the
other's ability to compete in a free market. Thus, the combi-
nation merits no exemption from antitrust liability. First,
each union has surrendered its individual freedom to conduct
negotiations for the good of its members, which falls squarely
within the Penninglon rule mentioned above. Second, as a re-
sult of the unions' agreement, the respective employers will be
prevented from bidding in a competitive market for the serv-
ices they need to maintain their production. A restraint of
trade results with no offsetting benefit to labor policy to save
the exemption.
Another reason that the agreement between Unions A and
B should not enjoy immunity from antitrust laws is that it has
extra-unit implications.'1 6 The NLRA encourages and sup-
ports collective bargaining for employees in a bargaining
unit." '7 It is this kind of conduct, union activity for the bene-
fit of its members in a bargaining unit, that is protected from
antitrust liability."' This does not necessarily mean that the
same activity which also impacts on other bargaining units
should be exempt. The Court in Pennington suggested that the
extra-unit impact of that agreement was another reason why
the union forfeited its exemption from antitrust liability." 9
The agreement between the two unions clearly has an ex-
tra-unit affect. The wages to be demanded by one unit are
being set by a union representing another unit. Under the
balancing process of the non-statutory exemption, the benefit
to the national labor policy must outweigh the injury to com-
petition or the exemption will be forfeited. In the two scena-
rios discussed previously, national labor policy is not
furthered because the NLRA only supports bargaining done
]l When the bargaining process between an employer an employee group affects
bargaining units outside that specific group, it is said to have extra-unit implications.
,' Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664-65.
" See supra note 80.
19 Pennington, 381 U.S. at 666. One commentator has suggested that Pennbigton does
in fact stand for the proposition that if an agreement has extra-unit implications, the
union involved will forfeit its exemption from antitrust laws. St. Antoine, supra note 2,
at 610.
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on a per unit basis."' ° At the same time, competition is in-
jured because employers are not free to bid for services in a
free market and because the unions have restricted their own
ability to act freely.12 1 The agreement thus does not deserve
the exemption from antitrust liability.
C. The Per Se Rule v. Rule of Reason
If it is concluded that the agreement between Unions A
and B does not fall under labor's exemption from antitrust
law, it must be determined by what standard of antitrust lia-
bility the unions' activity is to be judged. Courts use two stan-
dards to determine whether certain activities violate the
Sherman Act. Theper se rule has been applied where the con-
duct involved is so blatantly anti-competitive that no inquiry
into the reasonableness of the conduct is needed. 22 Price-
fixing agreements have been held to be such per se viola-
tions. 12 Under the "Rule of Reason," the reasonableness of
the conduct is scrutinized to determine if it imposes an undue
restraint upon competition.2 4 The Supreme Court has not
yet addressed the question of whether aper se or rule of reason
analysis should be used in a labor situation in determining
liability under antitrust laws.
A good argument can be made for the application of theper
se rule of illegality to the arrangement between Unions A and
B. First, it is clearly a price-fixing agreement. Price-fixing
agreements have been ruled per se violations since 1927.125
Second, lower courts have supported the use of theper se ille-
gality test when determining the legality of employers' agree-
ments to fix wages of employees. 26
, Pennizgton, 381 U.S. at 666-68.
,.2 Id. at 668. The Court in Pennington stated that the policy of antitrust is clearly set
against agreements seeking to prescribe labor standards outside the bargaining unit.
Id
d22 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
21. A. STICKELLS, FEDERAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS: ANTITRUST LAWS § 42 (1972).
"I Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
125 United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
12.See, e.g.,Jacobi v. Bache, 377 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),aJ'd 520 F.2d 1231 (2d
Cir. 1975),cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976); Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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InJacobi v. Bache,127 the district court stated that any agree-
ment with the purpose of fixing or stabilizing prices is per se
illegal, even if it only indirectly impacts on the final product
market." 8 Similarly, in Robertson v. National Basketball Associa-
tion,29 the district court compared the owner's arrangement
to practices which had been traditionally held to be per se
violations of the antitrust laws. 3° Importantly, the Supreme
Court has affirmed lower courts' use of theper se test in situa-
tions where members of a profession have fixed the prices of
their services. 13 ' Thus, there is some support for the applica-
tion of the per se illegality test to the hypothetical agreement
between Unions A and B.
Support also exists for the use of the "Rule of Reason" in
analyzing the legality of agreements in the la-
bor/management field. While some courts have sanctioned
the use of the per se test in this area, 132 other courts have ex-
pressly rejected its use and opted instead to use the "Rule of
Reason."' 133
In Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc. 131 the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia rejected the district court's ruling
that the owner's arrangement was a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. 135 The court held that the per se rule was not
the appropriate test to be applied because the draft's impact
was not "pernicious"'' 36 and because the draft was not with-
out some redeeming value. 137
Similarly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Mackey v.
Jacobi v. Bache, 377 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
' ' Id at 95-96.
,29 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d. Cir. 1977).
"- Id at 893.
,:,, See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); National Soc'y of Profes-
sional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). These cases involved some form of
price-fixing by learned professional associations.
.... See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
133 See infra notes 134-143 and accompanying text.
Smith v. Pro-Football, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978), afg in part, revg in part,




National Football League 138 rejected the district court's applica-
tion of the per se rule to the NFL draft and "Rozelle Rule."
The court in Mackey reasoned that the per se rule was only
concerned with business competition in a general sense and
was thus inappropriate for the situation; the per se rule was
not concerned with persons who may have some mutual in-
terest in the success of other "competitors."'' 39 In Commerce
Tankers Corporation v. National Maritime Union of America, "0 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected the use of the
per se illegality test in the labor/management field. The
court considered theper se test to be inappropriate because of
the "complex and significant questions"' 4 ' on the interaction
between federal antitrust and labor laws.' 42 According to the
court, aper se approach would not permit the court to prop-
erly accomodate the conflicting policies of labor and antitrust
law. 43
Underlying their rejections of the application of a per se
analysis to labor/management relations is the fact that courts
are reluctant to apply a mechanical approach where two
valid federal policies are in conflict. In a traditional price-
fixing arrangement between firms, free trade is restrained,
and there is no corresponding furtherance of a national pol-
icy to offset this harm. In the labor/management area, there
is such a policy that is potentially being furthered. The
mechanical application of the per se test could do more dam-
age than good.
In Commerce Tankers, the court noted that by applying aper
se approach, antitrust liability would automatically attach
once the non-statutory exemption was forfeited. 44 In the
court's terms, this was "a per se approach with a
vengence.' 45 The court interpetedJewel Tea as requiring an
- 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
,19 Id at 619.
'- 553 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1977).
4' Id at 801.
,4 Id at 801-02.
" Id at 802 n. 8.
141 Id
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application of the "Rule of Reason" to cases in this area.
Judge Fienberg in Commerce Tankers stated, "A fair reading of
Jewel Tea satisfies me that the Court intended there to be a
full scale rule of reason inquiry on every instance in which a
non-exempt activity is claimed to be a violation of
antitrust."'' 46
The rejection by courts of the use of theper se illegality test
in judging activities in the labor/management area is not the
only reason why the the "Rule of Reason" should be applied
in this area. Courts would have little or no difficulty in ap-
plying the "Rule of Reason" to collusive union activity be-
cause the "Rule of Reason" analysis is similar to the weighing
process laid out in Pennihgton ,'4 7Jewel Tea, 48 and Connell.'49
The "Rule of Reason" requires a court to weigh the restraint
of trade imposed upon the market by the particular conduct
against the reasonableness of the restraint and its necessity.150
In the weighing process of Pennington and its progeny, a
court must weigh the union interest in the subject against the
restraint that is imposed on the market by union conduct. 5 '
Both processes thus require the court to balance the injury
done to free competition against another factor, either the
reasonableness of the restraint or national labor policy. Be-
cause of their familiarity with the weighing process, courts
are well equipped to use the "Rule of Reason" in situtations
involving collusion among labor groups.
CONCLUSION
Resolving the conflict between national labor law and the
policy behind it and the Sherman Act's ban on anticompeti-
tive behavior has long been the bane of the American judicial
system. United States courts have been saddled with the task
of reconciling two fundamentally conflicting bodies of law
1'1; Id.
"4 Penninglon, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
'"Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
,41 Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
- Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976), cert de-
med, 434 U.S. 801 (1979).
"'Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 691.
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into a cohesive, workable legal doctrine. On the one hand is
the Sherman Act which is directed at anti-competitive activ-
ity, and on the other hand are the national labor laws, which
foster, encourage and protect the very type of activity pro-
scribed by the Sherman Act in order to further a different
national policy. The fact that both of these laws and the poli-
cies behind the enactment and enforcement of each are
deeply entrenched in the social and political fiber of this
country makes the task of the courts a difficult one.
It would be difficult to predict how a court would decide a
case presenting either of the hypothetical situations. On ini-
tial reflection, one is inclined to doubt if a court would find
such activity to fall outside the labor exemption to antitrust
laws. The fact remains that the unions in the posed situations
are merely acting in their own interests. It is labor acting on
the behalf of labor and no one else. Despite the decline in
recent years of membership in organized labor unions, the
idea that workers need to be given some protection in their
pursuit of legitimate goals is still strong. Even in recent deci-
sions imposing antitrust liability on unions, courts have reaf-
firmed the concept that such union activity should be
protected. The strength of that idea suggests that a court
would not impose antitrust liability on the union.
Society's interest in maintaining a free market system is
just as deeply entrenched in America's social and political in-
stitutions as are the policies behind the national labor law.
However, it remains that the unions have combined to re-
strain trade in a manner which would normally be consid-
ered to violate the Sherman Act. The form of the
combination should be unimportant. The labor exemption is
given to a single union acting alone in the interests of its
members. The exemption should not be extended to exempt
multiple union anti-competitive conduct from antitrust lia-
bility. Also, the fact that the labor exemption is an exemp-
tion to the general antitrust laws suggests that the exemption
should be read narrowly.
The Supreme Court in recent years has moved away from
giving labor a broad exemption from the antitrust laws. The
1983]
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recent trend has been to scrutinize labor activity which is
anti-competitive, even if it is in a collective bargaining agree-
ment on mandatory subjects. Since the non-statutory exemp-
tion has evolved into a weighing process, the outcome of such
a suit could be determined by the policy which society feels at
the time is most important.
